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Change and contradiction:
a criticism of the Hegelian account of motion
Emiliano Boccardi1
Abstract
In his In Contradiction (1987), Priest levelled three powerful arguments
against the received Russellian view of change and motion. He argued
that his preferred paraconsistent theory of change, the Hegelian account,
is immune from these objections. Here I argue that these three arguments
are sound, but that the Hegelian account falls pray to them too. I
conclude, however, that the Hegelian account is in a better position to
tackle these challenges.
1. Introduction: the received view of motion and change
The idea that things change and that time passes is deeply entrenched in our cognitive
and emotional lives. Yet, as soon as we try to explicate these notions in clear conceptual
terms, we are immediately faced with great difficulties. Of all the ways in which this worry
can be expressed, perhaps the most famous, and the most perspicuous for our purposes,
are Zeno‘s celebrated arguments against motion.
Consider an object in uniform motion from location x to location y (the tip of Zeno‘s
arrow, for example). And consider any particular instant during its journey, t0, during
which the tip is located exactly in the position x0, and only at that position. At, or during
t0, the arrow advances not at all away from x0, in its journey to y. Any such advancement,
in fact, would take a finite amount of time, however small. The duration involved in this
advancement, therefore, would not be an instant, contrary to the hypothesis. Now, the
whole interval of time during which the journey of the object supposedly occurs is made
up of such instants. Since no advancement is achieved during any of those constituting
instants, it seems to follow that no advancement can be made in any number of them,
however great this may be. If no advancement can be made during any time interval,
then no advancement is made by the object, contrary to the hypothesis.
At any time t0 during its journey, according to this premise, the tip of the arrow
is located exactly in the position x0, and only at that position. As Aristotle put it in
his famous reconstruction, at any time during its journey, the arrow “occupies a space
equal to its size”. What makes this premise nearly compelling is that denying it seems
contradictory. How could the tip of the arrow be and at the same time be not located at
position x0? How could the arrow occupy a space greater than its size?
According to an often-recounted philosophical gossip, one that is reported in any
introductory physics textbook, this dilemma was finally solved by the invention of calculus.
As they struggled to come up with a suitable mathematical description of continuity and
continuous change, Leibnitz and Newton, independently from one another, developed
the fundamental notions that constitute what we now know as calculus. Despite its
immense fruitfulness in the development of modern science, and its wide spread use among
physicists and mathematicians, it was not until the end of the 19th Century that these
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notions found a coherent systematization in what is known as the “classical foundation
of calculus”. As we shall see, however, such coherentization was obtained at the price of
a radical reconceptualization of the relevant notions, one that arguably deprives them of
their intuitive appeal in the dissolution of Zeno’s paradoxes. The central idea involved
in this reconceptualization is the quantificational understanding of limits: rather than
treating derivatives as ratios of infinitesimal quantities, according to this (now familiar)
understanding, limits should be understood as quantifiers.
Let us consider how this idea applies to the notion of instantaneous velocity. Instan-
taneous velocity, according to the classical view, should be understood as the limit of a
sequence of ratios of finite quantities:
vpt0q “ dx
dt
pt0q “ lim
∆tÑ0
xpt0 `∆tq ´ xpt0q
∆t
This formula, in turn, should be understood as expressing the fact that the values
of the finite ratios xpt0`∆tq´xpt0q
∆t
become indefinitely close to vpt0q, the limit, as we chose
smaller and smaller values of ∆t: for all  ą 0, there exists a δ ą 0 such that for all
∆t ă δ: |xpt0`∆tq´xpt0q
∆t
´ vpt0q| ă .
It should be stressed that the expression “become indefinitely close” ought to be
thought of as a dead metaphor, reminiscent of a time when the continuum was con-
ceived as the product of actual motion, and variables as denoting varying quantities:
“infinitesimals are an attempt to extend to the values of a variable the variability which
belongs to it alone. When once it is firmly realized that all the values of a variable are
constants, it becomes easy to see, by taking any two such values, that their difference is
always finite, and hence that there are no infinitesimal differences.” ([17], p. 357).
Russell enthusiastically took the classical coherentization of calculus as providing us
with a coherent response to Zeno’s challenge: “people used to think that when a thing
changes, it must be in a state of change, and when a thing moves, it is in a state of motion.
This is now known to be a mistake. When a body moves, all that can be said is that it
is in one place at one time and in another at another.” ([16], p. 69).
This admittedly paradoxical idea that things could change without ever being chang-
ing, also known as the at-at theory of change, appears to be uniquely capable of making
sense of change without postulating true contradictions, and quickly became the received
view.2
2. Priest’s three objections to the Russellian view
In his book In Contradiction ([14]), Priest put forward three lines of criticism to the
at-at theory of change, with which I fully agree. In this section I will present these
criticisms and defend them from some possible objections.
2 This idea was not new, and a debate over its virtues can be traced back at least to medieval times.
William of Ockham and his followers advocated a view according to which change is nothing over and
above a sequence of different properties had at different times. It was known as the doctrine of changing
form (forma fluens), and it opposed the dual-fact account known as the doctrine of change of form (fluxa
formae). According to the latter, when a leaf (for example) changes its color from green to yellow, not
only does it have a determinate shade of (say) green at any given time, but, over and above, it also has
a changing shade of green (the dual fact). According to the former, on the contrary, there is no further
fact over and above the leaf having different shades of green at different times.
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2.1 The problem of incremental accretion. As we have seen, the source of the discom-
fort one feels when confronted with the arrow paradox is that one finds it hard to intuit
how the arrow could manage to get anywhere by a series of going-no-where’s. Part of the
appeal of the original (incoherent) understanding of infinitesimals was precisely that it
appears to alleviate this discomfort, since it allows us to conceive of any stretch of time
or space as composed of infinitesimal ‘line elements’, whose individual contribution to the
total advancement of the arrow, while infinitesimal, is not null.
A way to illustrate the intuitive appeal of the original conceptualization is to contrast
the case of a polygon revolving on a plane without sliding, with the case of a circle so
advancing (see fig. 1).3
As the polygon ad-
vances, each of its sides
touches the plane in its
due turn, so that when
a total rotation is com-
pleted the total stretch
of space touched by the
polygon, equal in size
to its perimeter, can be
seen to consist of a finite
sum of discrete “jumps”,
each equal in size to one
of its sides. If we try
to replicate the same rea-
soning to the case of a
circle revolving on the plane, we are instantly met with a great difficulty. Here too,
the figure touches the ground with one element at a time, each in its due turn. However,
unlike what happens in the case of the polygon, the element of the circle that touches the
ground at each time is a dimensionless point. Since there is no sliding, moreover, just as
it happens in the case of the polygon, the velocity of each of these point-elements relative
to the ground is a 0.
How could the circle manage to advance, if its advancement consisted of a series of
null contributions, each of which in its turn consists of a dimensionless point of the circle
touching the ground without moving with respect to it? Prima facie, construing of the
circle as a limit case of a polygon with infinitely many “sides” or “line elements”, partly
alleviates this discomfort, allowing us to describe the two situations as (at least partly)
analogous. But this understanding of continuous motion is precisely what the classical
foundation of calculus is supposed have banished:
These days no one worth his salt thinks instants “add up to” periods this
way. If there are instants, periods are instants with distance-relations be-
tween them. The relations, not their relata, account for periods’ extension:
3 This paradoxical scenario, known as the problem of the Rota Aristotelis, was first discussed in the
Greek work Mechanica, traditionally attributed to Aristotle. Upon completing a full rotation, the centre
of the greater wheel will be displaced by a distance equal to its circumference. However, as the greater
circle completes a full rotation, the smaller wheel, which is attached to it, completes a full rotation too.
So, by an analogous reasoning, we ought to conclude that the centre of the smaller wheel (which is the
same as that of the greater one), will have moved by a distance equal to its smaller circumference. A
contradiction. The scenario was famously discussed by Galileo in his Two New Sciences.
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that is why (in the paradox) without putting distance-relations between the
points, we don’t get an extension. [Leftow 2014 [12], p. 239].
However, the mere definition of a mathematical function, called “distance”, whose
values are totally independent from the individual advancements achieved at each instant
during the journey, can at best be seen as a restatement of the problem, rather than its
solution. As Priest rightly points out:
That one can prove a small mathematical theorem or two is one thing;
but it does not ease the discomfort that one finds (or at least, that I find)
when one tries to understand what is going on physically, when one tries
to understand how the arrow actually achieves its motion. At any point
in its motion it advances not at all. Yet in some apparently magical way,
in a collection of these it advances. Now a sum of nothings, even infinitely
many nothings, is nothing. So how does it do it? [ibid., p. 175]
The problem we are discussing should be distinguished from the mere problem of
understanding how a static infinite aggregate of dimensionless elements could ‘add up’
to a finite quantity. In the dynamic setting that we are considering, this problem is
further aggravated by the fact that these elements enter the scene one at the time, so
that it is hard to understand how we could deny that these solitary facts should make a
“contribution” to the total feat. In the case of a static, or standing variety of infinity, all
the elements are already there, waiting to be named and counted, as it were, and so are all
the relations that obtain between them. Two points of a line have the distance they have
quite independently from the existence of any intervening points. These standing elements
need not be reached in any sense, nor should their distance count as an achievement of any
kind. The situation is crucially different in the case of a growing variety of infinity, which
is what is at issue here. To be told that the distance between the bow and the target
is some finite quantity only proves that if the target could be reached, then the total
advancement of the arrow would be equal to that quantity. It tells us nothing, however,
about whether such feat can be accomplished, since it tells us nothing about the physical
formation of this path during the journey. To use Bergson’s apt words, according to the
Russellian view, “movement is composed of immobilities” ([4], p. 308).
2.2 The problem of the non-intrinsicality of motion. Standard physics textbooks tell
us that the state of the universe at any time is determined by the state at any previous
time plus the laws of physics. The state of the universe at a time t, we are told, is given
by the positions of all the particles at t, plus their velocities at t. However, according to
the Russellian view, the instantaneous velocities of the particles supervene solely on their
positions at various times preceding and succeeding t, hence they add nothing to the state
of the universe at exactly the time t. Now, the positions of particles at t have clearly no
effect whatsoever on the positions in the immediate future of t. How could their velocities
have any greater explanatory role, if they supervene solely on these positions themselves?
As Priest put it:
It follows from the definition that there is no such thing as an intrinsic
state of motion. If one had a body in motion and took, as it were, a logical
“picture” of it at an instant, the picture obtained would be no different from
one of the same body at the same place, but at rest. Of course, an object in
motion can have an instantaneous non-zero velocity, but it would be wrong
to think that this differentiates it intrinsically from a static body. [ibid., p.
173]
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Some authors tried to derive less dramatic consequences from the application of cal-
culus in response to Zeno’s argument, denying that the quantificational understanding
of limits and derivatives renders instantaneous velocity a relational property (cf. Smith
2003 [18]). I have argued elsewhere that this view, known as “the modified at-at the-
ory of change”, is untenable.4 Here I shall content myself with presenting a symptom
which aﬄicts the Russellian account, and which I think lends indirect support to Priest’s
observation.
It has been often noted that it is hard to understand how Russellian instantaneous
velocities could fulfill the explanatory role that is standardly ascribed to them in physics.
This is well illustrated by the following argument by Frank Arntzenius:
Consider a ball moving from right to left through some region in space,
and a qualitatively identical ball, perhaps the same one, some time later,
moving from left to right through that very same region. If the full state
at a time of a ball does not include an instantaneous velocity then the full
state of the two balls is exactly the same when they occupy the same region.
[...] Why does the one ball subsequently move to the left and the other ball
subsequently move to the right? Surely it is conservation of velocity, or
something like that, which determines that the one ball will keep moving to
the left and the other will keep moving to the right. But if there is no such
thing as instantaneous velocity, as there is not in the at-at theory, then why
do the balls continue their motions in different directions? [[2]: § 2.]
This objection has been raised several times under different guises in the recent lit-
erature.5 It appears to expose a fatal shortcoming of the received view, one that derives
directly from the non-intrinsicality of change. The general problem appears to be that
Russellian velocities make the state of the universe at an instant conceptually dependent
on its states at other instants, since the velocity objects have at a time is a property of
their trajectory around that time, not an instantaneous intrinsic property.6 This deprives
these “states” of all their explanatory power.
2.3 The problem of the direction of time. The third and last criticism raised by Priest
against the standard view is that it appears to be incapable of accounting for the intrinsic
directedness of time and change, the so-called anisotropy of time. Time and change always
happen in one direction only, from earlier to later, from past to future. Here then is the
difficulty, in Priest’s words:
What accounts for the anisotropy of time? This again has been a thorny
problem, particularly for those who have denied the reality of the flow
of time. They have had to locate the anisotropy of time not in time
itself, but in processes in time - a tall order, since apparently all causal
laws are time-symmetric. [Ibid., p. 116].
Now, while Priest is surely right that reconciling the apparent irreversibility of physical
processes with the time-reversal invariance of fundamental laws is a “thorny problem”, I
think that mentioning this in that context obscures the full force of his objection. To see
why, it is worth discussing briefly a common fallacy. It has often been suggested that the
second law of thermodynamics, which implies that the entropy of a closed system never
decreases, could be used to explain and reduce the directionality of time itself. According
4 [6], pp. 164-168.
5 See for example [1], [11], [2], [19], [5], [9].
6 See for example [1], p. 10.
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to these suggestions, the future direction of time is nothing but the direction in which
global entropy increases. The passage of time would be grounded by the fact that the
entropy gradient is not zero. But these reductive accounts cannot succeed. The second
law of thermodynamics, in fact, can only establish a contingent correlation between the
entropy gradient and the direction of time. If the intrinsic direction of time was not
fixed independently from the entropy gradient, how could we even meaningfully express
the empirical content of the law? What does it even mean to say that entropy never
“increases”, if not that it never increases in the direction of the future?
Imagine a world where the second law does not hold. It would be a world where broken
glasses would spontaneously recombine to end up on the tables from which they fell. But
In order to even represent this possibility, we have to assume that the broken-glass states
in that world would be instantiated before the on-the-table states. If the direction of time
itself were reversed in such a scenario, then that world would be just indistinguishable
from ours! In fact, the second law of thermodynamics would hold in that world too, and
by necessity, contrary to the hypothesis. As Tim Maudlin quite aptly put it, if the future-
directed arrow of time amounted to nothing but the direction in which entropy increases,
“[entropy] could go up and down like the stock market, but since the ’direction of time’
would obligingly flip along with the entropy changes, entropy would still never decrease”
(2007, p. 129).
What was said about the second law applies equally well to any other time-asymmetric
law postulated for grounding the direction of time, regardless of whether it be a funda-
mental law or a statistical one (as is the case with the second law). The general lesson to
be learned by the failure of these reductive attempts is this. Mere asymmetric relations
are never enough, by themselves, to fix a direction. At best, asymmetric relations can
determine an order among the elements of their domains. But mere order is “blind” to
directionality, so to speak. Three points on a line, for example, have an order. B lies
between A and C, etc. However, these betweenness relations are insensitive to the direc-
tion in which the series might be transversed (from A to C, or from C to A). Asymmetric
relations determine an order, but not a direction. Unfortunately, this direction, or sense,
is precisely the feature that any account of time and change should explain, and that the
Russellian account struggles to accommodate.
3. Priest’s Hegelian account of motion
This is where we stand. Zeno’s arguments appear to show that time and change are
contradictory. The main attempt to remove these contradictions without denying time
and change altogether, the now widely accepted Russellian account, proves to be at best
a restatement of the problem. We are thus faced with a dilemma. Either accept the
phenomenological datum that things change and time passes, at the cost of accepting
that at least some contradictions are true; or hold fast to the principle of contradiction,
and repudiate time and change as mere appearances. Heraclitus and Hegel (according
to some interpretations) opted for the first horn of this dilemma. Parmenides, Zeno and
McTaggart, instead, opted for the second one.
To make matters worse, as I have argued in my Boccardi and Perelda 2018 ([8]),
the claim that time and change are mere appearances runs the risk of being itself self-
contradictory, lest it be carefully qualified. In claiming that our experience represents the
world as instantiating dynamic features absent from reality, the denier of change must
be careful not to concede too much, as she would if her account required that dynamic
experiences themselves (or their contents) instantiate dynamic properties incompatible
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with the B-theory. It is not enough to claim that passage is mind dependent in the sense
that it requires the interaction of a conscious subject with external reality (as is the case,
for example, in [3]). The strict denier of passage wants to further claim that the content
of the experience of passage is never true of the actual world, not even of that part of it
consisting of the interactions between subjects and their objects: ‘the dynamic character
of our immediate experience does not require time itself to be dynamic’ ([10]: p. 391).]
This view, I argue, is self-undermining. If we concede that change and time are mere
appearances, doesn’t it follow necessarily from this that at least these appearances really
change? If every time that things appear to us to change we make a mistake, in that the
things that appear to change don’t really change, isn’t it still true that we make different
such mistakes at different times, and hence that at least appearances themselves really
do change?
Everything suggests that time and change are real and contradictory. Very few philoso-
phers, however, took seriously this option, since questioning the principle of contradiction
threatens to blow a fatal strike at the heart of rational thinking itself. It is unfortunate
that the few philosophers who took up the challenge of denying the principle, most no-
tably Heraclitus and Hegel, are among the most obscure and cryptic thinkers of all times.
The philosopher Graham Priest, in more recent times, devoted a good part of his career
to the herculean task of raising the vague contention that (some) contradictions might be
true to the highest standards of clarity and analytic thinking.
This unprecedented accomplishment was made possible, among other things, by the
discovery and development of logical systems that block the Principle of Explosion (ex
contraditione quodlibet). These systems, known as paraconsistent logics, opened the way
for a non-trivial treatment of true contradictions, or dialetheia. One paraconsistent logic
that is particularly apt for this purpose is the so-called logic of paradox (LP), introduced
by Priest in his [13]. Using this logic as background, Priest was able to put forward
a dialetheist account of motion that promises to overcome the three deficiencies of the
standard account that we discussed above.
Let me introduce this account. I will then proceed to illustrate how the account is
supposed to overcome the three difficulties mentioned above. Finally, I shall argue that
the Hegelian account suffers from the same difficulties as the Russellian account (sec. 4).
According to Priest, what prevented us from developing a suitable treatment of time
and motion, vis a vis the problems that we have been discussing, is the assumption that
bodies in motion occupy coherently one exact position at the time, at the expense of all
others:
Consider a body in motion-say, a point particle. At a certain instant of
time, t, it occupies a certain point of space, x1, and, since it is there, it
is not anywhere else. But now consider a time very, very close to t, t1.
Let us suppose that over such small intervals of time as that between t
and t1 it is impossible to localize a body. Thus, the body is equally at
the place it occupies at t1, x1 (Hence, at this instant the body is both at
x and at x1 and, equally, not at either). [Ibid., p. 176]
The idea can be spelled out as follows. Let the motion of the body be represented by
the equation x “ fptq. According to the Russellian view, the proposition that the body
is located at position r at time t is true if and only if r “ fptq. It is false if and only
if r ‰ fptq. According to Priest’s account, instead, for each time t during the motion of
the body, there is an interval containing t, θt, called a “spread”, such that, if t1 P θt, the
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occupation of the body’s location at t1 is “reproduced” at t. In other words, the proposition
that the body is located at position r at time t is true if and only if, for some t1 P θt,
r “ fpt1q. It is false if and only if for some t1 P θt, r ‰ fpt1q.
To see why this view is dialetheist, it is perhaps better to characterize it in terms of
state descriptions. Let q denote any quantity, ranging over a set of values V (for example,
the real numbers). Let vptq “ q be a function of time, and Qprq be the predicate that
q has value r. Finally, let St “ tQprq : r “ vptqu Y tQprq : r ‰ vptqu. The propositions
contained in St state that at t the value of q is vptq and not any other value. St can then
be thought of as the state description of the system at time t. The spread hypothesis
amounts to the claim that, for every time t, there is an interval containing t, θt, such
that the complete state description at t is the set theoretic union of all the consistent
state descriptions Spt1q for all the t1 P θt : Ypt1PθtqSpt1q. Clearly, if the state of the system is
changing in a neighbourhood of t, such union will be inconsistent.
3.1 Priest’s account of temporal passage. One of the most interesting features of
Priest’s treatment of change is that it promises to be applicable to all sorts of change,
including the peculiar kind of change - if it is a kind of change at all - which the passage
of time consists of.
When change is conceptualized in a Russellian fashion, as the instantiation of different
states at different times, it becomes conceptually absurd to claim that time itself changes
in any sense. And yet there is something impermanent about time. We make a gesture
towards this feature when we refer to the incessant âadvancementâ of the present towards
the future. It is perhaps not a chance that all the metaphors that we use to express the
impermanence of time are metaphors of motion. We say that time passes, that it flows,
that it flies. We approach the end of the semester, etc. What does the passage of time
have in common with change in general, and with motion in particular? What is the cash
value of these metaphors?
In this regard, the intrinsicality of change in Priest’s account constitutes a great ad-
vantage. We have discussed the account as it applies to motion, but we might as well have
applied it to any other magnitude as well, charge, mass, or whatever. According to the
Hegelian account, for a quantity, any quantity, to be in a state of change is for it to be in
a certain contradictory state.7 This very general idea of change lends itself immediately
to an application to the case of time itself. Here is how this is supposed to work.
Let q denote the state of time, whatever this may be, and V the set of the reals. The
proposition Qptq, for example, could mean that time t is present. Let vptq, finally, be the
identity function. Applying the spread principle as we did above, one can see that, for
each time t, there exists a interval θt such that, for all t1 P θt, Qpt1q is true at t. The claim
that time is passing, or that the time that is present is constantly “changing”, can then
be seen to rest on the fact that the spread θt is non degenerate, or equivalently that the
state description of time is always inconsistent.
Let us now turn to Priest’s application of the Hegelian account to the three challenges
presented above. In what follows I illustrate the proposed application of the Hegelian
account to tackle the three challenges discussed above. I argue that the account falls pray
to all of them.8.
7 Priest of course is not denying that if a quantity assumes different values at different times then it
has changed. The claim is rather that this is not what change could consist of.
8 Some of the arguments against the Hegelian account presented here can be found in my Boccardi
and Bustos 2017 ([7])
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4. The Hegelian account and Priest’s three objections
4.1 How the Hegelian account is supposed to tackle the problem of incremental ac-
cretion, and why it fails. Priest argues that the Hegelian account of motion ought to be
preferred to its rival, the standard Russellian view, since the spread hypothesis solves at
one stroke all the difficulties mentioned above. Let us see how this is supposed to work in
each case, starting from the problem of incremental accretion. The problem, remember, is
that of explaining how a series of non-advancements might produce a finite displacement,
a positive advancement. Here is how the spread hypothesis is supposed to overcome this
difficulty:
The Hegelian account of motion may be taken to locate a fault in the
[arrow] argument, but at a point different from that upon which Russell
lights. For, according to Zeno’s argument, at a particular point in time
the object occupies only a single point in space, whence it follows that
it advances not on its journey during that instant, i.e. that the measure
of the set of points occupied at that instant is zero. Given the spread
hypothesis, however, it is not true that the moving body occupies only
a single point. At an instant, t, it occupies all the points in Σt, which
is, in general, not a singleton. Indeed, provided the function of motion,
f , is continuous, Σt is an interval, and therefore has non-zero measure.
Thus, advance is made during a single instant, and hence during the
aggregate of instants. [Ibid., p. 180]
This response, I argue, squeezes out of the Hegelian account more than it can deliver.
The unwarranted assumption, crucial for giving the appearance of a solution to Zeno’s
paradox, is that the mere fact that the instantaneous location of the object be of non-zero
measure would suffice to make of it an “advancement”. A way to expose the role of this
subtle but crucial assumption is to note that Zeno’s argument can be easily generalized
to apply to the Hegelian account as well. Here is a Hegelian friendly version of Zeno’s
arrow argument.
At each moment during its journey, the arrow occupies (inconsistently) a region of
space the same size as its spread Σt. During each instant t, the spread Σt of locations
occupied by the arrow advances not at all. Then how does it manage to advance over a
finite interval of time, given that this is constituted by nothing but a sequence of such
spreads?
The inconsistency of the Hegelian locational schema resides in the fact that the spread
Σt which the arrow occupies at time t is larger than the size of the arrow itself. But why
should we think that this larger space occupied by the arrow constitutes an advancement
of the arrow? If at each moment during the journey the arrow occupies the spread Σt,
then the motion of the arrow can only consist of its subsequently occupying different
spreads, each in its due turn. How this feat is achieved, the account does not say.
Another way to expose this difficulty is by considering Priest’s intriguing hypothesis
that quantum mechanical indeterminacies might constitute the physical ground of the
spreads:
Perhaps the measure of Σt, σpΣtq, just is the uncertainty in the location
of the object at t. Perhaps quantum mechanical indeterminacies are
fundamentally the result of inconsistencies in motion, and in particular
in the spread postulated by the spread hypothesis. This suggestion at
least allows us to give physical significance to the spread. (Ibid.)
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The difficulty under discussion here can be exposed by constructing a quantum version
of Zeno’s arrow, and then testing the Hegelian interpretation against it. Consider then
a particle whose locational state at time t is given by the wave function Ψpx, tq. The
Zenonian argument then goes as follows. Over the finite interval of time rt0, t1s, the state
of the particle changes from Ψpx, t0q to Ψpx, t1q. But at each time during its journey the
state of the particle changes not at all. How is it, then, that in a sum of changing-not-at-
all’s the particle manages to instantiate a different state?9
On the Hegelian interpretation, the instantaneous states represented by Ψpx, tq should
be construed as representing inconsistent superpositions of exact locations. But notice
that the inconsistency of the account is never used by Priest to solve the problem of
incremental accretion. As Priest noted in objecting to my criticism, the only feature
of it that is relevant is the non-zero length of the location occupied by the particle at
the instant.10 However, it should be noted that whether the particle occupies a single
dimensionless point at an instant, as the standard view has it, or an inconsistent spread
of locations, it does so consistently: on the Russellian account the particle occupies a
point of space at the expense of all others, while on the Hegelian account it occupies
a spread of locations at the expense of all others. The challenge is to explain how the
location occupied might change without ever being changing. It seems to me that with
regard to this, the Hegelian account faces exactly the same difficulty as the Russellian
one.
Of course, the discomfort would be alleviated if the view was that the arrow proceeds
by “jumping” discretely from one spread of locations to the adjacent one. In this case,
its advancement would be analogous to that of the revolving polygon, where each side
touches the ground all at once, contributing to the whole journey with an advancement
equal to its finite length. But this is not Priest’s view. The edges of the spread, as well
as all the other points inconsistently occupied by the tip of the arrow at an instant, are
all durationless points. During each instant of time, all these locations advance not at all.
Yet, if the arrow is to reach its target, it has to occupy all of these points, one by one, in
succession. How does it do it?
One can also express this worry by noting that the whole arrow, unlike its tip, does
occupy a finite amount of space at each instant during its journey. Yet, nobody is tempted
to consider the extension of the arrow as an “advancement” towards its target. The spreads
occupied by the tip of the arrow at each instant of time, I argue, are no different from
the whole arrow, when it comes to accounting for the advancement of the arrow. Each
position inconsistently occupied by the tip of the arrow has no element of movement, just
like the positions consistently occupied by it in the Russellian account don’t.
4.2 How the Hegelian account is supposed to tackle the problem of non-intrinsicality
of motion, and why it fails. As we have seen, one of the problems with the standard
account is that it makes intrinsic velocities - and states of change in general - relational
or neighborhood properties. The Hegelian account promises to solve this problem rather
well:
This is obviously no problem for the Hegelian account. For it, there is
an intrinsic state of motion: a certain inconsistent state. The difference
between a body genuinely in motion and one changing place but at rest
9 In my Boccardi and Bustos 2017 ([7]) we argue that the quantum interpretation of the spread
hypothesis is problematic, for a technical reason that I shall not repeat here.
10 See Priest’s response at minute 41:30 of https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iR58cnYyviw&t=2014s.
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each instant is exactly that between a Hegelian state description and
the corresponding Russellian one. [ibid., p. 180]
Priest is surely right that his account renders motion an intrinsic feature of objects.
And this is prima facie an advantage. The problem, remember, was that Russellian
intrinsic velocities are properties of trajectories, rather than intrinsic temporary properties
of objects. This rules them out as potential explanations for these trajectories themselves.
Now, the positions that the arrow may (inconsistently) occupy at any given time according
to the Hegelian account are totally unrelated to the locations it may occupy at any other
time. So, the Hegelian account at least does not have this problem.
However, it could be argued that the inconsistent spread of locations at a time is not
the right kind of intrinsic state. Notice, in fact, that in a Russellian world the positions
(consistently) occupied by all objects at a time do constitute a temporary intrinsic state
of the universe at that time. Yet, nobody would be tempted to consider that state as the
ontological ground of instantaneous motion. Why? Presumably, because the position of
an object at a time is totally, not merely conceptually, independent from its position at
other times. Two identical locational states of the universe may yet diverge radically as
to their dynamic properties.
Now, how is the inconsistent spread of positions postulated by the Hegelian account
different in this respect? The spread occupied by the arrow at a time is totally, not
merely conceptually, independent from the spread it occupies at other times. So why
should we think that it has anything to do with motion? Why should the instantiation of
inconsistent states of affairs as to the location of the ball at a time “force” it, or “induce
it” or “dispose it” to be elsewhere at other times?
It will be objected that this criticism asks too much from a theory of motion. After
all, the complaint against the Russellian view was that it renders the velocities of objects
at a time t (and hence the instantaneous states of the universe at that time) conceptually
dependent on the positions of the objects at all times around t, thus depriving them
of their explanatory power. Isn’t it preposterous, then, to complain that on Priest’s
account intrinsic states of motion do not entail the correlated trajectories? The spread
hypothesis, by itself, does not explain the trajectories precisely because it complies with
the requirement that it be conceptually independent from them! At best, one could
require that there be a causal, or law-like connection between intrinsic states of change
and trajectories. This is exactly what Priest does (Ibid., p. 179).
I think that this line of defense is fair. However, I still think that my objection points
at a difficulty with the Hegelian account, for two reasons. First, the ambition of the
theory is to provide an account of change in general, not of motion only. We have seen,
for example, how this generality allows us to apply the Hegelian account to the passage of
time itself. If Priest were right, true contradictions would not just contingently correlate
with trajectories: they would constitute the ontological ground of change in general. They
would be the essence of change, as it were. This is one of the chief allures of the Hegelian
account. Given the generality of the account, however, I think it is not unreasonable
to demand an elucidation of this systematic connection. Of course, one could postulate
a different causal connection for each kind of change. However, the general pattern of
connections would still cry for an explanation, lest it be a bizarre fluke.
The second worry that I have with the “just so” response that we are considering, is
that it is in tension with Priest’s use of the spread hypothesis in tackling the problem of
incremental accretion. The problem, as James put it, was that the “conceived positions,
however numerously multiplied, contain no element of movement, so Zeno, using nothing
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but them in his discussion, has no alternative but to say that our intellect repudiates
motion as a non-reality.” [James 1987: 735.]. If the spread hypothesis is to tackle this
problem, the contradictory states must not only provide us with a cause for the trajecto-
ries. They must further be the basic instantaneous elements of motion itself. Each spread
occupied during the journey of the arrow must make a contribution to the whole journey.
Therefore, each spread must be, and not merely cause, a kind of displacement. If things
are so, the total lack of conceptual dependence between contradictory state descriptions
and trajectories in the Hegelian account is just as problematic as the total conceptual
dependence between them in the Russellian account.
4.3 How the Hegelian account is supposed to tackle the problem of the direction of
time, and why it fails. It is undoubtedly an interesting advantage of Priest’s treatment,
as we have seen, that it applies to the passage of time just as well as it applies to any
other kind of change. Priest also claims that the Hegelian view can account for the
intrinsic directionality of passage, something that standard accounts are at great difficulty
to explain. On this latter point, I dissent from Priest. The solution proposed rests on the
observation that: “θt will not necessarily be distributed symmetrically about t. In fact,
there are reasons to suppose that t is the leading edge of θt, so that the interval is skewed
all to the past of t, at least normally.” [Ibid., p. 214]
This asymmetry in the distribution of the spread, according to Priest, would solve the
problem of grounding the directionality of time:
Again, the solution to the problem on the present approach is obvious.
Since the identity function is monotonically increasing, vptq is always
the upper bound of the spread of q at t. Thus, the direction of the flow
of time is perpetually from past to future, which seems just about right.
[ibid.]
The problem with this solution, just as for the Russellian account, is that it tries
to ground directionality on mere asymmetry. We have already seen how this feat is
impossible. Priest surreptitiously avails himself of a primitive notion of directedness when
he claims that the identity function is monotonically “increasing”. The identity function,
by itself, is neither increasing nor decreasing, just like the great pyramid of Giza is neither
ascending nor descending.
The problem can be aptly illustrated by considering the order induced on the real
numbers by the relation smaller-than. Like any relation that is asymmetric, connected
and transitive, the relation smaller-than induces an order on the reals. In addition, the
reals present a structural asymmetry. This can be seen by noting that the positive reals
have a square root, while the negatives don’t. As Reichembach ([15], p. 26) noted,
this asymmetry can be exploited to differentiate structurally the relation smaller-than
from its converse, the relation greater-than. This can be done, for example, by saying
that any number which is the square of some number is greater than any number which
is not the square of some number. This feature of the reals provides the series with
a kind of “directionality”. However, this anemic kind of directionality is not the kind
of directionality that Priest is seeking to ground. Mere order, even embellished by the
perfection of structural asymmetry, does not determine any directionality. To see this, it
suffices to observe that, despite the structural asymmetry of the relation smaller-than, it
simply makes no sense to ask whether the reals are increasing or decreasing, or whether
they “run” in one direction as opposed to the other.
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5. Conclusion
Zeno’s arguments appear to show that time and change are contradictory. The main
attempt to remove these contradictions without denying time and change altogether, the
now widely accepted Russellian account, proves to be at best a restatement of the problem.
We are thus faced with a dilemma. Either accept the phenomenological datum that things
change and time passes, at the cost of accepting that at least some contradictions are
true; or hold fast to the principle of contradiction, and repudiate time and change as
mere appearances. Priest has shown that the first option is not as abhorrent as we may
think, and that it ought to be seriously explored. He also claimed that the Hegelian
account ought to be preferred to the Russellian one on the ground that it is immune
from the problems of incremental accretion, of the non-intrinsicality of motion, and of the
directionality of time. I have argued that this is not the case. The Hegelian account does
not help overcoming these difficulties.
However, I think that Priest’s account does present a number of advantages over the
Russellian one. The main one is its generality. As we have seen (sec. 3.1), the account
can be applied to the case of temporal passage, a problem that is apparently intractable
within a Russellian world view. Secondly, even if the spread hypothesis does not solve
the three problems, it seems to be in a better position to solve them. For example, even
if the hypothesis does not solve the problem related to the non-initrinsicality of change,
at least it points in the right direction, by making change an intrinsic state of affairs.
For the same reason, I think that Priest’s view is also in a better position than its rival
when it comes to solving the problem of the directionality of time. As we have seen, the
mere asymmetry in the spread could not, by itself, account for the directionality of time.
However, whatever does so ground directionality, arguably, must at least supervene on
some intrinsic state of affairs.
Finally, Priest’s account helps to explain why the issue of contradiction proved so
recalcitrant in connection with time and change. Contradictions, qua contradictions, I
have argued, don’t appear to contain any essentially dynamic element. However, the
suspicion that the idea of change might be contradictory has continued to resurface over
and over in the history of philosophy, and all attempts to dissolve these paradoxes proved
to be unsatisfactory. Thus, it should not come as a surprise if it turned out that change
essentially involves true contradictions.
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